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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
JOHN GALLACHER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent/ 
vs. 
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF SKIN 
CARE AND JALAINE HANSEN, 
Case No. 870111-CA 
Defendants and Appellants, 
000O000 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
000O000 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal of a small claims judgment rendered in the 
Eighth Circuit Court, Orem Department. The action in the Small 
Claims Court was commenced by the father of a student at the 
school run by Defendants for a refund of tuition and other fees 
paid. The Court ordered a refund in the amount of $800.00. 
Jurisdiction is conveyed on this Court to hear appeals by 
Defendant from actions filed in a Small Claims Court by Section 
78-6-10(2) U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows: 
(a) Whether the Plaintiff in this action has any standing 
to take legal action against Defendants and, if so, may he assert 
a defense to a contract in behalf of his daughter, now ever 18 
and able to bring her own action. 
(b) Whether the contract made between Defendants and Sandie 
Gallacher, the daughter of Plaintiff herein, is voidable, as 
found by the Court below, because it was entered into by a minor. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS RELIED UPON 
The following Statutory Provisions of the Utah Code and 
rules of Civil Procedure will be relied upon by Defendants in 
support of their arguments: 
15-2-1 U.C.A. Period of Minority 
The period of minority extends in males and 
females to the age of eighteen years; but all minors 
obtain their majority by marriage. It is further 
provided that courts in divorce actions may order 
support to age 21. 
15-2-2 U.C.A. Liability for Necessaries and on 
Contracts - Disaffirmance. 
A minor is bound not only for reasonable value of 
necessaries but also by his contracts, unless he 
disaffirms them before or within a reasonable time 
after he attains his majority and restores to the other 
party all money or property received by him by virtue 
of said contracts and remaining within his control at 
any time after attaining his majority. 
15-2-3 U.C.A. Limitation on Right to Disaffirm. 
No contract can be thus disaffirmed in cases 
where, on account of the minor's own misrepresentations 
as to his majority or from his having engaged in 
business as adult, the other party had good reason to 
believe the minor capable of contracting. 
Rule 17 U.R.C.P.: 
(a) Real Party in I n t e r e s t . 
Every a c t i o n s h a l l be p rosecu t ed in the name of 
t h e r e a l p a r t y in i n t e r e s t . An e x e c u t o r , 
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administrator guardian, bailee, trustee of an express 
trust/ a party with whom or in whose name a contract 
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party 
authorized by statute may sue in his own name without 
joining with him the party for whose benefit the action 
is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action 
for the use or benefit of another shall be brought in 
the name of the State of Utah. Mo action shall be 
dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in 
the name of the real party in interest until a reason-
able time has been allowed after objection for ratifi-
cation of commencement of the action by, or joinder or 
substitution of, the real party in interest; and such 
ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the 
same effect as if the action had been commenced in the 
name of the real party in interest. 
(b) Infants or Incompetent Persons. 
When an infant or an insane or incompetent person 
is a party, he must appear either by his general 
guardian, or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the 
particular case by the court in which the action is 
pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any 
case when it is deemed by the court in which the action 
or proceeding is prosecuted, expedient to represent the 
infant, insane or incompetent person in the action or 
proceeding, notwithstanding he may have a general 
guardian and may have appeared by him. In an action in 
rem it shall not be necessary to appoint a guardian ad 
litem for any unknown party who might be an infant or 
an incompetent person. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant American University of Skin Care is a Utah 
Corporation which operates a school of cosmetology in the State 
of Utah. Defendant Jalaine Hansen is not an officer or director 
of the corporation, but is responsible for the day to day 
activities of the school. Sandie Gallacher signed an agreement 
with the school for the purpose of obtaining certain educational 
classes from the school on January 8, 1987. Classes were to 
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commencef and did commence/ on January 13, 1987f the date of her 
18th birthday. No consideration for the contract was given on 
January 8thf but Sandie Gallacher paid to Defendants a check for 
$800.00/ signed by her father, on the the 13thf the date of her 
birthday/ and the date of the beginning of class. On that datef 
she was asked tof and did/ initial the contract indicating her 
continued assent to the contract provisions/ and in particular to 
the added provision that there would be no refunds for this 
particular type of class. Sandie commenced schooling as 
scheduled/ and continued such schooling for two to three weeks. 
Thereafter/ she became disenchanted/ and dropped out. A demand 
for a refund was made by Sandie's father/ the Plaintiff in this 
actionf citing various reasons which may have constituted failure 
of consideration or fraud/ and was denied the refund/ based upon 
the initial contract. Legal action was taken in the Small Claims 
Court for the full refund at which time various allegations were 
discussed. The Court made no ruling in reference to any other 
claim made by Plaintiff/ but ruled that the contract was made 
prior to Sandie's 18th birthday/ and was voidable by Sandie. The 
Court therefore ordered a full refund of the amount paid under 
the contract. Sandie had received a "kit1* consisting of certain 
items needed to complete the course. The Court/ apparently 
relying upon the statutes cited above/ ordered the kit returned 
to Defendants. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendants make two specific arguments to the Court in 
support of their prayer to reverse the lower court and remand for 
further hearing. Firstf Defendants allege that John Gallacher 
was not a party to the contract and that he may therefore not be 
a party to this legal action; or that if he is, he may not assert 
his daughter's minority as a defense to the contract. 
Defendants secondly ask this Court to rule that the lower 
court erred in finding that the agreement signed by Sandie 
Gallacher was in fact a contract signed before her eighteenth 
birthday and therefore subject to being voided by the Court in 
the action. Defendants contend that the contract was actually 
entered into at the time the money was paid and schooling was 
commenced. If the contract was actually entered into prior to 
that time, the actions of Sandie Gallacher after her eighteenth 
birthday were a ratification of the contract, taking it outside 
of the action of the statute allowing voidability. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF IN THIS ACTION IS NOT A PARTY TO THE 
CONTRACT AT ISSUE AND HAS NO STANDING TO BRING THIS 
ACTION. IF PLAINTIFF IS A PROPER PARTY, HE MAY NOT 
ASSERT MINORITY AS A CONTRACTUAL DEFENSE, AS HE IS 
CLEARLY NOT A MINOR. 
Rule 17 U.R.C.P. as cited above, states that the real party 
and interest should be a party to a legal action. If that person 
is a minor, the court is to appoint a guardian ad litem to 
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represent the interests of that person. In this particular case, 
a contract was entered into by a person who was, at the time of 
the original signing, a minor. Almost immediately thereafter, 
however, that person achieved her majority. She no longer needs 
a guardian ad litem to protect her, and indeed must be a party to 
this action if relief is to be granted. The reason, apparently, 
she has not been made a party is that her father gave her the 
money, and it is him who wants his money back. That does not 
give him standing to enter into this legal action instead of his 
daughter. His agreement was with her, not Defendants. The Utah 
Supreme Court, in Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands and 
Forestry, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986) stated that "...this court 
will not lightly dispense with the requirement that a litigant 
have a personal stake in the outcome of a specific dispute." The 
court there went on to say, in discussing standards of standing 
to litigate: 
The premises upon which these standards have been 
constructed is that issues should generally be 
litigated by those parties with the most direct 
interest in resolution of those issues, ... 716 P. 2d 
796. 
The issue here is whether or not the contract, to which 
Plaintiff was not a party, is voidable by a minor. This 
Plaintiff has no interest whatsoever in the resolution of that 
issue. Plaintiff is not a minor, and was not a minor for some 
time prior to the contract. Plaintiff has no legal right to 
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benefit from the provisions of the law regarding a minor's right 
to void a contract. In the case of Clark v. American Standard 
Inc> 583 P.2d 618 (Utah 1978), the court ruled that a corporate 
officer who had signed a contract in behalf of a corporation did 
not have standing to enforce that contract. The case was 
remanded to the district court for a determination as to whether 
the plaintiff could have qualified as a third party beneficiary, 
with some interest in enforcing the contract. In doing so, the 
Supreme Court asked the Trial Court to make a determination of 
whether the plaintiff was an "intended beneficiary" of the 
contract at the time the contract was made, by both parties to 
the contract. Clearly, the fact that Sandie's father may have 
given her the money for her schooling does not give rise to any 
duty in Defendants to the father. Clearly he is not a party to 
the contract, and clearly he is not a beneficiary. 
II. THE CONTRACT BETWEEN SANDIE GALLACHER AND 
DEFENDANTS WAS NOT VOIDABLE UNDER STATUTE BECAUSE OF 
HER MINORITY. 
Admittedly, Sandie Gallacher, at the time she originally 
signed her schooling agreement with Defendants was under the age 
of 18 years. She had no capacity to contract, outside narrow 
exceptions. Defendants do not claim that this contract falls 
within those exceptions. This contract, however, provided for 
the payment of an $800.00 tuition fee, (including a registration 
fee and a fee for materials) by Sandie Gallacher and the 
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provision of certain educational services by Defendants. The 
contract, by its terms, was to commence on January 13, 1986, 
Sandie's 18th birthday. On her 18th birthday, Sandie returned to 
Defendant's place of business with her check. She was told at 
that time if she intended to go through with the contract that 
she would have to agree to a no refund policy, due to particular 
circumstances of the services which would be provided. She was 
asked to initial the contract again, where the alteration had 
been made on that date, indicating her assent to the additional 
term. She did so, and paid the money at that time. On that 
date, she commenced her schooling. She continued her schooling 
for a period of two or three weeks, before deciding that it was 
not what she wanted, and dropping out. It is the contention of 
Defendants that the contract was actually made on her 18th 
birthday, and was not voidable based on minority. On that date, 
Sandie paid the money and started the schooling. It should be 
from that date that the contract be deemed effective. 
Utah Case Law on this point is basically non-existent. The 
Court of Appeals of the State of Colorado, however, in Jones v. 
Dressell, 586 P.2d 1057 (Colo. App. 1978) made the following 
statement: 
It is well settled in Colorado that a contract entered 
into by a minor is not void but only voidable by the 
minor. Affirmance is not merely a matter of intent; it 
may be determined by the actions of a minor who accepts 
the benefits of a contract after reaching the age of 
majority, or by his silence or acquiescence in the 
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contract for a considerable length of time. 
Thus, on reaching the age of eighteen plaintiff was 
required either to disaffirm the contract within a 
reasonable time, or be bound thereby. And, the 
undisputed facts established that, after turning 
eighteen, plaintiff did not only disaffirm the 
contract, but instead ratified it by accepting the 
benefits thereof. Hence, his being a minor when he 
entered the contract is without significance as to its 
present enforceability against him. (Citations omitted) 
582 P.2d at 1058. 
That case was later affirmed by the Supreme Court of 
Colorado in Jones v. Dressellr 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981) in 
affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court 
added: 
We agree that what constitutes a reasonable time for 
affirmance or disaffirmance is ordinarily a question of 
fact to be determined by the facts in a particular 
case. We conclude, however, that the trial court 
properly determined that Jones ratified the contract, 
as a matter of law, by accepting the benefits of the 
contract when he used Free Flight's facilities on 
October 19, 1974. 
Thus, since Jones ratified the contract, the factual 
issues of whether his suit for personal injuries was 
filed within a reasonable time after attaining his 
majority and constituted disaffirmance of the contract, 
is not relevant. Accordingly, the entry of summary 
judgment on the issue of ratification was not error. 
623 P.2d at 374. 
Whatever time the contract was entered, it is clear that 
Sandie Gallacher ratified the contract after the date of her 
eighteenth birthday. She paid the money at that time, she 
commenced study at that time, and continued study for a 
substantial period of time after her eighteenth birthday. Upon 
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deciding that she did not like the school, she cannot run back to 
the time before the contract, and claim she was too young to 
enter into it. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants ask the Court to rule that the lower court herein 
was in error in its ruling that the contract entered into between 
Sandie Gallacher and American University of Skin Care was 
voidable. If it was voidable, it cannot be voided by her father, 
a person who has no interest in such voidability. 
Upon such a ruling, Plaintiff's action should be dismissed. 
As an alternative to dismissal, the matter should be remanded to 
the Trial Court for further hearing on other issues not ruled 
upon by that court. 
DATED this ( day of Jrrrre', 1987. 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, JENSEN & IVINS 
 L . 
li  /  aire
tdZhtL 
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Appellantsi 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
day of -*u*e/l987r I did I hereby certify that on the 
mail ir^ o true and correct copies of the above and foregoing 
Request for Production of Documents, postage prepaid, to John 
Gallacher, Attorney pro se, 1510 North 230 East, Logan, Utah 
84321. 
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